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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
March

12, 1993 Order Denying

Petitioner's Motion

for Review

alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as
a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for Review of that
Order was timely filed with this Court on April 5, 1993.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only substantial issue presented for review is whether Mr.
Draper's claim for permanent partial disability benefits is barred
by the application of the ffgoing and comming11 rule.
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to
the agency's view of the law is required.

Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d)
(1988).

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah

1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
1

compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner.

State

Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah

1977).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 is the determinative
statute in this case.

It is set forth in full in the Addendum

thereto as Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Draper seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
workers' compensation occasioned by his industrial accident.
Course of Proceedings
Mr.

Draper

filed

an Application

for

Permanent, Partial

disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of an
industrial injury on or about January 15, 1991.

(R. at 1). None

of the parties disputed that Mr. Draper suffered an accident (R. at
8); however, Respondents alleged that Mr. Draper's accident did not
occur in the "course and scope of his employment11 and that he was
precluded from benefits due to the application of the "going and
coming rule".

(R. at 19-24).

A hearing was held on September 8,

1992. (R. at 65).

1

Disposition Below
On or about October 3, 1991, Applicant filed an Application
for Hearing alleging that as a result of an industrial injury he
was entitled

to workers compensation

benefits.

(R. at 1).

Defendant's moved to Dismiss on the basis that Applicant's claim
was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that since he was
injured while driving to work that pursuant to the "going and
coming"

rule, he was

benefits.

not

eligible

for workers

compensation

(R. at 19-25).

A hearing was held on September 8, 1992 at which time certain
medical records and affidavits were received.

(R. at 68). The

parties agreed to argue and obtain a ruling on the Motion to
Dismiss prior to going forward with the Hearing (R. at 69).
The Administrative Law Judge found that although the Applicant
had not filed a workers compensation claim within 180 days of the
accident, that his employer was aware of the accident and the
circumstances surrounding it and thus held that his claim was not
barred

by

the

Statute

of

Limitations.

(R. at

71).

The

Administrative Law Judge further found that the "going and coming
rule" precluded recovery of workers compensation benefits for
injures which occurred going to and from work off the premises of
the employer because those actions were not considered to be "in
the course of employment". (R. at 71).

The Administrative Law

Judge further found that there was "no evidence of any special
hazard which the Applicant encountered to bring him within the
special hazard exception".

(R. at 74).
3

Defendants Motion to Dismiss was granted on the grounds that
the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the
Applicant's

employment

and

his

Application

for

Hearing

was

dismissed with prejudice (R. at 74-75, copy attached to Addendum as
Exhibit B ) .
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on
October 9, 1992 (R. at 76).

On March 12, 1993 the Industrial

Commission affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and adopted it as its own.
(R. at

115-126, copy

attached

to Addendum

as Exhibit C ) .

Applicant challenges that final Agency action in this Petition for
Review. (R. at 122-123).
Statement of the Facts
There is no argument between the parties as to the material
facts. (R. at 116). The Applicant was driving to work in the early
morning of January 15, 1991.

It was a

snowy morning, snow was

falling, visibility was poor, and the roads were icy.

(R. at 96).

Mr. Draper was proceeding west along 700 South, which is a public
road in Clearfield, Utah. He stopped to turn left onto Industrial
Parkway, which leads to his place of employment. The Borden-Clover
Club warehouse where Petitioner worked was approximately 7/10ths of
a mile south down Industrial Parkway from the intersection.

Only

3/10s of a mile of Industrial Parkway is owned by the City of
Clearfield, the rest of the Parkway road is gated off and owned by
the parkway Industrial Complex.

Petitioner testified that the

route he had taken, was the only practical route he could take to

1

enter the private road to his employer.

(R. at 51-52).

About 500 feet further west, 700 South Street ends with a gate
into the Freeport Center.

At this time of the morning there is

heavy traffic moving out of the Freeport Center going East on 700
South because of a shift change.
intersection waiting

Mr. Draper was stopped at the

for this traffic

to clear so he could

negotiate a left turn into the Industrial Parkway road, which is
the only entrance into his place of employment.

(R. at 51-52).

Petitioner was rear-ended by Mr. Mumford while waiting on 700
South to turn left.

(R. at 116). Mr. Mumford states his vision

was obscured by snow, and he slid on ice while trying to stop. (R.
at 55). There were several raised train tracks crossing 700 South
about 1/10th of a mile east of the intersection, as shown in the
photographs and maps submitted by the Petitioner.

(R. at 58-60).

Mumford stated:
I don't recall a train on the tracks, but I did look both
ways while crossing the tracks. This is why I didn't see
the car stopping ahead of me. The road is narrow and has
no turn lane. (R. at 53).
Mr. Mumford and the investigating officer agree "that the hazardous
road conditions were the proximate cause of the accident."

(R. at

152-153).

The Petitioner was severely injured as a result of that

accident.

(R. at 4-5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)

Petitioner's injures were sustained in the course and scope of
his employment. Although incurred on the way to work, Petitioner's
claim is not bared by the so called "going and coming rule1'.
Petitioner provided substantial evidence of special hazards, i.e.,

1

heavy traffic, (2) poor visability due to falling snow, (3) icy
raods, and (4) raised railroad tracks.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's determination that Petitioner's claim is barred by the
"going

and

coming

rule11

and

remand

with

instructions

to

the

Industrial Commission to convene a Medical Panel to examine the
medical causation issue.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
Few

principles

of workers' compensation

law

are

as well

established in this State as that workers' compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of

the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently

principle from 1919 to the present.
796 P.2d

676

(Utah

1990);

reiterated

this

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,

State Tax Commission v.

Industrial

Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405

P.2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew

v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 189 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).

The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
^employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other, should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering his Findings of Fact
and Conclusions

of Law

failed

to apply

this vital rule of

construction. Nowhere in his Findings or Conclusions is there any

7

evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in
favor of the claim".

Rather the Administrative Law Judge and the

Industrial Commission apply a strict construction of the law and
resolve doubt against the claim.

This case turns on the narrow

facts of whether special hazards existed, which would take the case
out of the purview of the "going and coming" rule. In determining
that special hazards did not exist the Commission did not apply a
"very liberal construction in favor of the injured worker", as
required by case law.
This principal of construction has special and recognized
application to the "going and coming" rule.

In a substantially

similar case urging the existence of special circumstances to
remove a case from the application of the "going and coming" rule,
the Industrial Commission in Soldier Creel Coal Co. v. Baily,
pointed out that:
As counsel for the Applicant so aptly points out, when
there are no decisive facts available in a case, the case
should be analyzed in a light most favorable to the
employee.
* * *

The workmen's compensation statute should be liberally
construed in favor of injured workman and his dependents,
and in case there is any doubt respecting the right to
compensation, such doubts should be resolved in favor of
his dependents.
It is because of this presumption that the Commission
feels that the Dependents of the Deceased Employee should
be entitle to benefits.
The entire underlying basis of the Order in this case, is thus
flawed.

The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane

and beneficent purposes" as required by law.

The entire Order

should be disregarded due to this conceptional flaw.
&

II
THE "GOING AND COMING" RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE DUE TO THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL HAZARDS.
The general rule, sometimes referred to as the going and
coming rule, is that an employee, having a fixed and limited place
of employment, is not entitled to benefits under the workers'
compensation act for injuries sustained while traveling to and from
his place of employment.
384 (Utah 1987).

Posso Cherne Constr. v. Posso, 735 P. 2d

While the employment may be the reason for the

employee embarking on his or her journey between the home and the
place of employment, it is a generally accepted proposition that
the employee is not entitled to portal to portal coverage. Travel
to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course
of

... employment."

Fidelity

& Casualty

Co. v. Industrial

Commission, 8 P.2d 617, 618 (Utah 1932).
Under the going and coming rule, travel between home and work
is considered a personal activity since the employee typically
performs services which benefit the employer only after his or her
arrival at the place of employment; therefore, injuries occurring
off

the work premises during

such travel are generally not

compensable. Sokolowski v.Best Western Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P. 2d
286 (Alaska 1991).

Furthermore, the hazards encountered by an

employee while going to or coming from the regular place of
employment are not ordinarily incidental to the employment since
the employee is exposed to dangers and risks to which all traveling
persons are exposed.

Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clark,

498 So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 1986).

There is, however, a recognized exception to the "going and
coming" rule, which is known as the "special hazards exception".
Professor

Larson

in his well

respected

treatise

on

workmen's

compensation has stated the exception as follows:
The commonest ground of extension [of the premises rule]
is that the off-premises point at which the injury
occurred lies on the only route, or at least on the
normal route, which employees must traverse to reach the
plant and therefore the special hazards of that route
become the hazards of the employment. 1A. Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.11 (1988).
In

order

requirements

to

must

qualify
be

for

this

satisfied:

exception,

(1)

There

the

must

be

following
a

close

association of the access way with the employer's premises, usually
meaning that it must be the only route to the work-place; (2) there
must be a special hazard

associated with this route;

(3) the

employee must be exposed to the special hazard because of his use
of the route; and (4) the special hazard must be the proximate
cause of the accident. Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709
P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985).
A review of the evidence in this case reveals that Applicant
satisfies all of those elements.
A.

THERE MUST BE A CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF THE ACCESS WAY WITH
THE EMPLOYEES PREMISES.

There can be little argument that Petitioner satisfies this
element to the special hazard exemption.

It is clear from the

maps, diagrams, and pictures of the scene (R. at 152-157, copy
attached to Appendix at Exhibit D ) , that this intersection where
the car of Applicant was struck is virtually the only access way

m

into the employer's premises.

All vehicles going into the Clover

Club property approach exactly as Petitioner did, heading west on
700 South. About 500 feet further West 700 South street ends with
a gate into the Freeport Center.

Petitioner's car was waiting at

the intersection on 700 South, prepared to turn left onto Parkway,
a private road leading to the Clover Club plant where he worked.
The actual Clover Club plant is at the end of the private road
about 1/2 mile from where the accident occurred. The private road
is narrow and privately maintained.

In fact, there is a gate

across the road about 500 feet south of the intersection.
Although there are two other businesses on the private road,
the Associate Pipe building is now empty, and Unit Distribution
building serves only a warehouse. The Clover Club facility is the
principal business in the area and accounts for the vast majority
of the automobile and truck traffic.

The street coming from the

north marked "Main Street11 is a very little used street.

For all

intents and purposes, the route taken by the Petitioner was the
only true access route to his employers property and the work site
he was required to report to. The accident occurred while he was
turning onto the private road of his employer.
In Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 556 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. 1977), the
employee was killed while driving to work from his home.

His

automobile had apparently left a causeway which cut across a lake,
at a curve one-quarter of a mile from the plant's back entrance,
and plunged into the lake, resulting in the employees death by
drowning.

The causeway was not the only access to the employer's
11

premises but was "regularly used" by two or three hundred employees
to get to the premises.

On the morning of the accident there was

a low hanging fog, resulting in poor visibility.

The Commission

found that the death was compensable under the special hazards
exception to the going and coming rule.

The employer appealed

arguing that the "close association of the access road to the
premises" rule was not met because the accident occurred onequarter mile from the plant. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that the criterion for applying the exception is causal
connection between the injury and employment, rather than sheer
distance or proximity.
Clearly there is a close association of the access way with
the employers premises. Petitioner would have had no other purpose
of being on that particular road other than obtaining access to his
employers premises. The fact that 3/1Os of a mile of that road is
publicly maintained does not disrupt the close association that
access way has with the employer's premises.

B.

THERE MUST BE A SPECIAL HAZARD ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
ROUTE.

There were at least four special hazards in the present case
which satisfy this requirement.

They are: (1) Heavy morning

automobile traffic moving to and from the Freeport Center and the
Clover Club facilities; (2) Poor visibility from falling snow; (3)
Icy roads covered with new snow; and (4) Raised railroad tracks
with

lifting

traffic

barriers

H

within

a

few

feet

of

the

intersection.
Consistent

with

the

liberal

application

of

the workers

compensation act, the Courts have found "special hazards" in a
number of cases.

In Diffendaffer v. Clifton, 430 P.2d 497 (Idaho

1967), the employees were to meet in a certain town and were led to
the job site by a foreman.

On the way they traveled a dirt road

and dust obscured their vision. While rounding a curve, the driver
of the car claimant was in lost control of the vehicle, and
claimant was severely injured in the resultant accident. The only
hazard in this case was the existence of a dusty road and the cause
of the accident was the driver losing control, never-the-less the
Court held that the injury was compensable.
The Florida Supreme Court in Narania Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms,
74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954) found an employee was forced to stop work
because of heavy rain and decided to drive to a barbecue stand for
coffee and shelter.

While driving on an unimproved road adjacent

to the company property, he ran into a tree.

The road was the

usual means of ingress and egress, but another exit was available
at the opposite end of the premises. In awarding compensation the
Court found the existence of special hazards and that the result
was not changed by statutory language requiring that the injury
occur both in the "course and scope of employment".
It is clear from the evidence that the heavy traffic, reduced
visibility, icy roads, falling snow and raised railroad tracks
constituted

special

hazards

which

occurred

uniquely

at

this

particular location. Petitioner was exposed to special hazards due
13

to the requirements of his employment.

C.

THE EMPLOYEE MUST BE EXPOSED TO THE SPECIAL
HAZARD BECAUSE OF HIS USE OF THE ROUTE.

It must be remembered that Petitioner's accident occurred
about 7:42 a.m. at a time when heavy traffic was moving into the
Industrial Complex to commence work, and trucks were moving out to
commence morning deliveries.

Heavy traffic was moving in and out

of the Freeport Center inasmuch as it was shift change time in the
Center, and all this traffic was using 700 South street.

It was

principally the traffic moving out of the Freeport Center that
caused Petitioner to be stopped waiting for traffic to clear enough
to make a left turn into his employment location.

The unusually

heavy traffic at this particular location is what resulted in
Petitioner having to come to a stop where he did.
As Petitioner approached the turn, he noted a train was near
the railroad crossing, and he looked back and noted the barriers
had come down.

He was the last car to cross the tracks.

The car

that rear-ended Petitioner came through the crossing after the
barriers had lifted.

Some idea of the amount of traffic blocking

Petitioner's turn can be judged by the fact he was still waiting
there to make his turn when the train passed and the barriers
lifted. After the barriers had lifted, Mr. Mumford looked both ways
as he crossed the tracks; he could see the Eastbound traffic but
could not see Petitioner's car until he was on top of it.
Obviously

the

automobile

traffic, coupled

with

the

railroad

crossing and the tracks were distractions; poor visibility, the

li

rise in the track location made it difficult to see a stopped car
only a few yards ahead. When Mr. Mumford observed the Petitioner,
he applied his brakes but skidded on the ice, sliding into the
Petitioner's car.
Petitioner testified that he had tried to convince the Clover
Club management to allow him to come to work a little later to
avoid traffic, but he was told he would lose his job if he was not
there at the required time. (R. at 53).

It was the employers

insistence that he be to work at the specified time, and that he
use to only real available route which exposed him to the hazards
which caused this accident.
D.

THE SPECIAL HAZARD MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT.

There can also be little doubt that the special hazards
existing that this particular site where the proximate cause of
Petitioner's accident.

If he had not been required to be at work

at the exact same time as other employees and at the exact time of
traffic moving in and out of the Freeport Center, then the accident
would not have occurred and he would not have been injured.
Mr. Mumford and Officer Kennephol stated

f,

that the hazardous road

conditions were the proximate cause of the accident."
157).

Both

(R. at 152-

The Defendants have presented no contrary evidence on this

point.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its March 5, 1993 Order
15

dismissing Mr. Draper's claim for permanent, partial disability
benefits for failure to prove an exception to the
coming" rule.

f,

going and

There were clear special hazards present in this

case which removes it from the purview of that rule.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical
evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical
panel.
DATED this 0^7

th day of September, 1993.

ROBERT A. BENTLEY, E S Q ^ ^
Attorney for Petitioner

13.

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this ^ 7 th
day of September, 1993 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Steve Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 545385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

(2 copies)

Mr. Richard Draper
2043 East Leeway Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

(1 copy)

File

(1 copies)
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 (1988).

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(October 23, 1992).

EXHIBIT C:

Order Denying Motion for Review (March 12, 1993).

EXHBIT D:

Maps and diagrams of accident scene.
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and
the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted,
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility
for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not
on the employee. (1988).

Exhibit A

STEVEN J, AESCHBACHER (A4527) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendants
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, .Utah 84145-Q385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION i
ooOoo
RICHARD DRAPER,

:

Applicant,

:

V.

:

CLOVER CLUB, BORDEN and
CIGNA INSURANCE,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

:
Case No.: 91001100

Defendants.
ooOoo
This matter came on for hearing pursuant to notice on
September 8, 1992, at 8:30 A.M.
with his counsel, Keith Sohm.

The applicant was present, along
Defendants were represented by

their attorney, Steven J. Aeschbacher.
Club was also present.

Lamont D. Nelson of Clover

Prior to taking testimony, a medical

records exhibit was submitted, along with several affidavits
submitted by the applicant.

Defendants had no objection to the

Affidavits of Officer Kennepohl and Mr. Mumford.

The defendants

raised several objections regarding the Affidavit of Richard
Draper.

They objected to his reference to Clover Club or Borden

owning the road, Industrial Parkway, onto which he was turning, as
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Exhibit B

without foundation.

They further objected to the distances shown

in Diagram "A", page 8, of the exhibit as inaccurate.

Defendants

proffered evidence that the distance from the railroad tracks to
the intersection of 700 South and Industrial Parkway was 2/10ths
of a mile, rather than l/10th of a mile as shown by the exhibit,
and that the distance along Industrial Parkway from 700 South to
the gate was 3/10ths of a mile, rather than l/10th of a mile as
shown by Mr. Draper.

Additionally, on page 10, Exhibit "D" of the

exhibit, they objected to the way the Borden-Clover Club building
was drawn on the map, and the applicant agreed that only the
southern most portion of the building was present.

With those

objections and corrections, the affidavits and attached exhibits
were admitted.
The defendants moved to dismiss on two grounds.

First,

on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the claims
since no notice of an industrial accident was given within 180
days of the accident to the employer or the Commission.

Second,

on the grounds that the employee was driving to work and, pursuant
to the going and coming rule, was not eligible for worker's
compensation benefits for this accident.

The parties and

Administrative Law Judge agreed to argue and rule on the motions
to dismiss prior to going forward with the hearing.

Issues raised

by the impairment rating submitted by the applicant from Dr. Rich,
and other questions regarding the period of TTD and the amount of
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PPD, if any, available were not addressed in light of the
dispositive nature of the motions to dismiss.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the following
facts are found:
The applicant was driving to work on January 15, 1991.
It was a snowy day.

The applicant was proceeding west along 700

South, which is a flat, straight, public road in Clearfield,
Utah.

He slowed or stopped to turn left onto Industrial Parkway,

which leads to his place of employment.

The Borden-Clover Club

warehouse where applicant worked was approximately 7/10ths of a
mile down Industrial Parkway from the intersection.

Industrial

Parkway is owned and maintained by the City of Clearfield for the
first 3/10ths of a mile heading south from 700 South, and is a
public street.
The applicant was rear-ended by Mr. Mumford while waiting
on 700 South to turn left.
trying to stop.

Mumford claims he slid on ice while

There were several train tracks crossing 700

South some distance in excess of l/10th of a mile east of the
intersection as shown in the photographs and maps submitted by the
applicant.

The applicant notified his employer that he had been

in a car accident, but did not claim that it was work-related.

In

September, 1991, the applicant claimed for the first time that the
accident was work-related or was industrially caused.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Even though the applicant did not file any worker's
compensation claim or explicitly notify his employer that he
thought he had an industrial injury within 180 days of his
accident, his employer was aware of the accident and the
circumstances surrounding it.

Accordingly, this claim is not

barred by the statute of limitations, and that aspect of
defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
The applicant argues that the going and coming rule
should not apply to this case because he encountered a "special
hazard" on the way to work.

It is argued that the special hazards

were the fact that there was heavy traffic, that there were train
tracks nearby, and there was snow and ice on the road.
In general, the going and coming rule precludes recovery
of worker's compensation benefits for injuries which occur going
to and from work off of the premises of the employer because those
actions are not considered to be "in the course of . . . employment."

Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166

(Utah 1985).

The "special hazard" exception may apply if there is

a close association of the access way with the employer's premises,
there is a special hazard associated with the route, the employee
is exposed to the special hazard with his use of route, and the
special hazard is the proximate cause of the accident. Id.
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threshold, and dispositive, question in this case \s whether there
was any special hazard associated with the route Mr. Draper took.
The fact of train traffic on the train tracks which
crossed 700 South some distance from the site of the accident is
of no relevance and has no causal relationship to the accident.
While perhaps if Mr. Draper had been hit by a train, this case
would be more like the other train/special hazard cases, clearly
this case is distinguishable and does not give rise to any such
special hazard exception.

The trains and tracks simply had

nothing to do with this accident.

There is no authority to

support applicant's claim that heavy traffic is a special hazard
within the meaning of the exception.

Indeed, in Cherne

Construction v. Possor 735 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court noted that it was aware of no case authority to
support a claim that "heavy traffic" was a special hazard.
Finally, applicant claims that snow or ice on the roads
creates a special hazard.

In support of this, the applicant

relies on two decisions of previous administrative law judges,
Dewsnup v. Price River and Willson v. Emery Mining.

Neither of

those decisions is controlling, and both are distinguishable on
the facts and the law.

First, the law changed after both of these

rulings to require that an accident both arise out of and be in
the course of employment to be compensable.
Annotated § 35-1-45 (1988, as amended).
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See Utah Code

Previously, the definition
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only required that the accident either arise out of or be in the
course of employment.

Since it is widely recognized that driving

to and from work is not considered to be in the course of employment, the change in the law defeats the applicability of either
case to this action.
Additionally, the facts in those cases are significantly
different from the facts here.

In this case, the applicant was on

a straight, flat road waiting to turn when a third party hit him.
The third party blames the accident on sliding on the ice. By
contrast, in the Dewsnup case, Case No. 81000575, the applicant
was on the only access to the mine where he worked.

The day

before his injury he had been unable to get to work due to the bad
conditions, and had to take a four-wheel drive vehicle to work at
the beginning of his shift the day he was injured.

On his way

home, he had an accident when his car skidded on ice and hit
railroad tracks which were adjacent and parallel to the road,
which caused his vehicle to tip over and resulted in serious
injuries to the applicant.

The Dewsnup case seems to turn upon

the involvement of the railroad tracks which caused his injuries.
By contrast, here the railroad tracks had nothing to do with the
accident.
Similarly, in the Willson case, Case No. 84000311, the
applicant was driving down a mountain road which was the only way
in or out of his job site.

The road had sharp curves on it and
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subjected him to going in and out of the glare o«: the sun, which
gave rise to the accident.

The judge found at page 3 of the order

that the injury arose out of his employment.

The 1988 amendment

to § 35-1-4 5 undermines the applicability of this case as well#
since it clearly is not "in the course of" his employment.
Additionally, the administrative law judge was not convinced that
the applicant was off the employer's "premises" at the time of the
accident.

Moreover, the difference between a winding road going

among canyon walls and trees which create glare and shadow is far
different from a level, flat city street where this accident
occurred.

There is nothing dangerous about the route Mr. Draper

took to work, and the transient fact that it was snowy on the day
of his accident does not mean that his accident arose out of and
in the course of his employment.

The ice could have caused an

accident at any point along his route to work, and the fact that
it happened as he was nearing his destination (but had not reached
it) does not make it compensable.
There is no evidence of any special hazard which the
applicant encountered to bring him within the special hazard
exception.

The car accident the applicant suffered did not arise

out and was not in the course of the applicant's employment with
Borden or Clover Club. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to
dismiss is granted on the grounds that this accident did not arise
out of or in the course of the applicant's employment.
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Accordingly, the Application for Hearing is disnr.sred with
prejudice.

Any motion for review from this order must be made

within 30 days of the date hereof or this will be treated as a
final order of the Commission.
DATED this

<6

day of

1992.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

CERTIFIED THISZ^DAY OF
OCTOBER, 1992'.
ATTEST:

JPatricin 0 . Ashby I
Commission Secretafy-

/
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600
RICHARD DRAPER,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*
*
*
*

CLOVER CLUB, BORDEN, and
CIGNA INSURANCE,

*
*

Case No. 92000425

*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 6346b-12.
The provisions of U.C.A.
applicable in this case.

Sections

35-1-1

et.

seq. are

The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the
commission.11 U.CA. Section 35-1-20 (1953).
The statutes further provide that:
A substantial compliance with the requirements of
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the commission, and they
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void
for any omission of a technical nature.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953).
The Commission has "the duty • • • and . • • full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to. ... administer and enforce all laws
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a) (1953) , and to "consider
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953).
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88
(1965) which provides:
••.The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
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parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the Worker's
Compensation Act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules.
Id.
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena.
The applicant timely filed his motion for review of the ALJ's
order of October 23, 1992. The findings of fact will be set forth
since there appears to be no argument between the parties as to the
material facts. The dispute in this motion for review revolves
around whether the applicant was within an exception to the "going
and coming" rule when he was injured while driving his automobile
to work.
The applicant was driving to work on January 15, 1991. It was
a snowy day. The applicant was proceeding west along 700 South,
which is a flat, straight, public road in Clearfield, Utah. He
slowed or stopped to turn left onto Industrial Parkway, which leads
to this place of employment.
The Borden-Clover Club warehouse
where the applicant worked was approximately 7/10ths of a mile down
Industrial Parkway from the intersection. Industrial Parkway is
owned and maintained by the City of Clearfield for the first
3/10ths of a mile heading south from 700 South, and is a public
street.
The applicant was rear-ended by another car driven by Mr.
Mumford while the applicant was waiting on 700 South to turn left.
Mr. Mumford claimed that he slid on ice while trying to stop.
There were several train tracks crossing 700 South some distance in
excess of l/10th of a mile east of the intersection as shown in the
photographs and maps submitted by the applicant. The applicant
notified his employer that he had been in a car accident, but did
not claim that it was work-related.
In September 1991, the
applicant claimed for the first time that the accident was workrelated.
The ALJ concluded as a matter of law that the applicant's
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and was timely
filed. Further the ALJ determined that the going and coming rule
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applied in this case, and that there were no special hazards which
created exceptions to the rule. As a result, he ruled that the
applicant's injury was not industrially related.
The applicant alleges in his motion for review that there were
at least four special hazards in the present case that would
justify recovery. He named these hazards as: (1) Heavy morning
automobile traffic moving to and from the Freeport Center and the
Clover Club complex; (2) poor visibility from falling snow; (3) icy
roads covered with new snow; and (4) raised railroad tracks with
lifting traffic barriers within a few feet of the intersection.
The going and coming rule precludes recovery of workers'
compensation benefits for injuries which occur while going to or
from work off of the premises of the employer because those actions
are not considered to be Min the course of ... employment."
Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah
1985). The "special hazard" exception may apply if there is a
close association of the access way with the employer's premises,
there is a special hazard associated with the route, the employee
is exposed to the special hazard by his use of the route, and the
special hazard is the proximate cause of the accident. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that it was aware of no
authority to uphold a claim based upon "heavy traffic" as a special
hazard. Cherne Const, v. Posso. 735 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1987).
Additionally, the train traffic on the tracks some distance from
the site of the accident had no causal relationship to the
accident, and is not relevant to this inquiry. This disposes of
two of the alleged special exceptions.
The remaining claimed special exceptions both deal with
adverse weather conditions, visibility and icy roads. To support
these exceptions, the applicant provides us with two opinions
issued by the Commission. Dewsnup v. Price River Coal Co.. Case
No. 81000575; Willson v. Emery Mining Corp.. Case No. 84000311.
Unfortunately, both cases were decided after the law was changed to
require that an accident arise out of and be in the course of
employment in order to be compensable. U.C.A. Section 35-1-45
(1953 as amended 1988). Under the less restrictive prior law upon
which Dewsnup and Willson were based, the applicant only had to
show either of the prongs. Currently, the applicant must show both
that his injury arose out of his employment, as well as that he was
in the course of employment.
The words "arising out of" as used in Section 45 refer to the
origin or the cause of the injury, whereas words "in the course of"
refer to time, place and circumstances under which it occurred.
Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 248 P. 490, 49
A.L.R. 415 (1926). Since there is no statutory definition of the
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term "in the course of employment, •• the legislature intended the
ordinary meaning under the common law. Utah Copper Co. v. Ind.
CgmmjMn, 62 Utah 33, 217 P. 1105, 33 A.L.R. 1327 (1923).

Although it is not immediately clear whether there is a
distinction between "arising out of" as contrasted with "in the
course of," the Supreme Court has informed us that an accident
arising out of employment has a more definite and closer causal
relationship than is necessary for the latter. M & K Corp. v. Ind.
Commin, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948).
In the "course of
employment," apparently requires that the employee render service
to the employer which the employee was required to do, or to do
something incidental to the employment at a time and place where
the employee was authorized to render such service.
Id.
Ordinarily, an employee is deemed not to be within the course of
his employment if he furnishes his own transportation and is
injured while going to or from the place where he is employed.
Barney v. Ind. Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 (1973).
As we understand the facts, the applicant was on a public
street (700 South) waiting to turn into Industrial Parkway which is
also maintained by the City of Clearfield for approximately 3/10 of
a mile. Under the circumstances, the location cannot be considered
to be on or near the employer's premises. The applicant admits
that there is another route into the location named "Main Street"
which is a little used street. Under the circumstances, we cannot
say that the route taken by the applicant was the only route which
could be used.
The whole purpose of the special hazard exception is to impose
on employers the risk of hazards which are not generally
experienced by the public, and are peculiarly related to the
employment within the scope of workers' compensation. At the same
time, there is an intent to exclude hazards to which the general
public is also exposed. In this instance, there is nothing to show
that either the snow in the air, or the snow and ice on the ground,
were any special hazards peculiar to the applicant's employment
with the respondents.
For all the above reasons, we affirm the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order, and adopt them as our own.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated October 23, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the order, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2) , 35-1-86, 63-46b-16,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Benjamin A. Sims, certify that I did mail by prepaid first
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the Denial of
Motion for Review in Draper v. Clover Club et al.. Case Number
92000425, on /JL March 1993 to the following:
Keith E. Sohm, Atty.
2057 East Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Richard Draper
2043 Leeway Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Steven Aeschbacher, Atty.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law Judge
(intra office mail)
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and Couriers v. Dep/t of Empl. Sec, et al.. Case No. 920621-CA
(Utah App. December 4, 1992). The requesting party shall bear all
costs to prepare a transcript of the Rearing for appeals purposes,

Stdphen M. Hadley
Chairman

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

^*t£L^ V^^S^
xolleen S. Colton
Commissioner

A-^

Certified t h i s \ ^ L day of^TAcwJ
ATTEST:
ATTEST!

1993.

V~
& .

Patricia 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary
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